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ABSTRACT: The authority of first person claims may be understood from an epistemic perspective or 
as a matter of social practice. Building on accounts of Hume, Nagel, and several more recent authors, 
it is argued that this authority should be understood as limited. To extend it beyond notions of what 
it is like to experience something, we shift from what should be a narrow subjective edge to a 
territory of objective claims, thereby reasoning incorrectly. A relevant application is the supposed 
authority of victims. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper I wish to discuss the supposed authority of appeals to personal 
experience. I explore both their epistemic credibility and their near-immunity, in 
some contexts, from critical scrutiny. 
 
2. HUME ON TESTIMONY 
 
I begin by considering issues of testimony as discussed in Hume’s essay on miracles. 
As is well known, Hume argued that evidence from human testimony could never be 
sufficient to establish the occurrence of a miracle. (Hume, 1993) In evaluating the 
strength of testimonial evidence for a given claim, we need to consider two 
fundamental aspects: first of all the trustworthiness of the person or persons who 
are making the claim and secondly the plausibility of the claim itself. 
Trustworthiness of witnesses to miracles is usually highly suspect and, Hume 
maintains, even if it were perfect, it would be outweighed by the implausibility of 
the claim itself. In the nature of the case, that claim must be implausible given that a 
miraculous event must be by definition a violation of the laws of nature. 
Trustworthiness may be considered under two aspects: competence, and 
motivational integrity with regard to a claim of this kind. Plausibility is judged with 
regard to the coherence of the claim with other empirically established claims – in 
other words, broad inductive support for that claim. Hume argued that testimony 
for a claim of miracle will never suffice to establish it as true or as well supported by 
evidence. 
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The need to consider plausibility and credibility is present not only regarding 
claims that others make on the basis of their experience but for claims that one 
would make on the basis of one’s own experience. If we are to accept claims on the 
testimony of another person, we must presume that other person to be trust- 
worthy, which in this context means that we presume him or her to have both 
competence and integrity with regard to the subject at hand. When there is reason 
to doubt either competence or reliability in the context, we may fail to accept the 
claim on that person’s sayso. (This framework is standard in contemporary accounts 
of testimony.) Nearly all of Hume’s considerations on these topics presume that one 
is considering the claim that a miracle has occurred on the basis of the testimony of 
persons other than oneself. The problem he emphasizes regarding miracles is that 
these other people were, or may have been, gullible, ill-educated, prone to religious 
enthusiasms, motivated to deceive in the context of establishing a new creed, and so 
on and so forth. In any event, Hume argues, testimonial evidence supplied by other 
people could not establish a claim that was overwhelmingly implausible, even if 
such persons were trustworthy to the highest degree. In Hume’s terminology, a 
miracle is a “violation of the laws of nature;” in one footnote he offers a more careful 
definition according to which the violation of the laws of nature must be due to the 
intervention of a supernatural entity. (Hume, 1993) 
The case where one seems oneself to have witnessed a miraculous event is 
barely alluded to in Hume’s essay. I find two spots, at most, and at both Hume’s 
comments are not exactly lucid. Hume considers an example featuring the Cardinal 
de Retz, who told a miracle story that he did not seem himself to credit, even though 
the witnesses to its claims were consistent and credible. Hume comments that the 
miracle alleged in that case, being supposed to have occurred in the eighteenth 
century, was unlike many others because the supposed event was not distant in 
time and space. But then he comments that even in a circumstance where a person 
was immediately present and thought himself to have observed a miraculous event, 
he could not accept the occurrence of the supposed miracle on the basis of just 
reasoning. Why not? Because the evidence would carry falsehood on its face: in 
other words, an event that one would suppose to be miraculous would (in the 
nature of the case) be highly implausible, given that it would be a violation of 
established laws of nature.  
What I conclude from this is that if one were, oneself, the witness in such a 
case, the logic assessing testimony would not work differently. One would have to 
question one’s own trustworthiness regarding one’s own experience, and that for 
the same sorts of reasons that apply to other people. Clearly one would have to ask 
about the plausibility of the miracle claim, which would by definition be maximally 
low, and also about motivations that might make one prone to error or deception 
about the claim and one’s own competence to assess claims of this sort. In the case 
of a claim to the effect that some wondrous event occurred, other people could be 
moved by vanity, heated imagination, religious enthusiasm, or fascination with the 
absurd and wonderful – as Hume so forcefully argued. So too could one could be 
moved in these ways oneself. And, accordingly, one would need to evaluate one’s 
own trustworthiness in such a case. 
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 If I believe myself to be experiencing or remembering some sensation or 
idea, I am in a sense a witness to my own experience. Say my experience leads me to 
assert that a miraculous event has occurred. I can of course consider the likelihood 
of my own claim; in the nature of the case, its likelihood must be low. I need also to 
consider my own trustworthiness regarding a claim of this kind. Could I be prone to 
error, misinterpretation, or self-deception about something like this? The answer is 
clearly affirmative: I am a human being like the others and will be subject to the 
same sorts of mistake. 
 
3. INCORRIGIBILITY? 
 
The idea that one may and often should scrutinize one’s own knowledge and beliefs, 
as based on one’s firsthand experience, is of course far from novel. Several decades 
back, philosophical discussions of the supposed ‘incorrigibility’ of beliefs about 
one’s firsthand experience were common. The consensus emerging from them was 
that there is no thing as the incorrigibility of first person reports, if by “incorrigible” 
we mean that such claims, sincerely made, cannot be false. A person can misreport, 
misunderstand, misdescribe, or misremember things from her own experience. She 
can make incorrect inferences, erroneous extrapolations, and so forth on the basis of 
what she takes to be her own experience. There is no incorrigibility in the case. 
Wittgenstein in his later work rejected the notion that ideas or sensations 
should be regarded as in any sense objects of experience that could be known. 
(Wittgenstein, 1963) On his account, roughly the following is true: one does not 
know one’s own experience; one lives through it. There are no objects to be known; 
one’s sensation or idea is not an entity in the head or mind, an entity one would be 
in a special position to observe or describe. On this account there would surely be 
no such thing as being an authority as to the correctness of a report about one’s own 
experience. I can call such experience firsthand and insist that it is ‘mine’, but on a 
Wittgensteinian account, it would amount to a category mistake to suppose that I 
make reports about it or that I am in possession of some epistemic privilege or 
authority as to the accuracy of such reports. Wittgenstein preferred to think in 
terms of avowals, and not of reports.  
 
4. NAGEL AND THE SUBJECTIVE POINT OF VIEW 
 
I shift now to consider the widely read essay “What is it Like to be a Bat?”. In that 
work, Thomas Nagel forcibly argues that an organism has conscious states if and 
only if there is something it is like to be that organism. (Nagel, 1991) This ‘something 
it is like’ is the subjective character of experience, the ‘pour soi,’ what the organism 
is like for itself as distinct from the ‘en soi’ or what the organism is like in itself. On 
Nagel’s account, I do know what it is like to be myself; presumably, since I am a 
human being, I know what it is like to be a human being. But I cannot know what it 
is like to be a bat. To know that, it would not suffice to understand how a bat would 
behave, or how I would behave if I were pretending to be a bat or were a bat. 
Behavior is not the issue. Nor is it a matter of me being myself, considering what 
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sort of experience a bat might have. Rather the question is how it feels for a bat to be 
a bat. And that I cannot know.  
Now Nagel begins with bats; this can only be a beginning. He chose bats for a 
reason, but clearly, similar difficulties arise if one tries to grasp what it would be like 
a member of any other species. I cannot know what it is like to be a dog, a robin, a 
spider or a dolphin. But do I know what it is like to be some human being other than 
myself? Do I know what it is like to be a young man? An African politician? A 
warlord? Nagel acknowledges that sometimes the problem of knowing what it is like 
to be another arises within my own species. He says that the problem is not 
confined to exotic cases. It also exists between one person and another. What is the 
problem? It is that of grasping the specific subjective character of the experience of 
another creature. Point of view, Nagel says, is the essence of the internal world; 
there is an internal world for a subject only from the perspective of that subject. I 
have my point of view. I do not have the point of view of a bat, a dog, a spider or a 
dolphin. Nor do I have the point of view of a young man, a warlord, or an African 
politician. Nagel asserts firmly that my experience of the world is intrinsically 
inseparable from my point of view. As a matter of basic metaphysics, I do not have 
the point of view of any other person in this room. This point of view, the stance 
from which I am conscious of the world, is mine and mine alone.  
If the point here is one about subjectivity and objectivity, then not only can I 
not know what it is like to be a warlord, I can’t know what it is like to be my closest 
woman friend. As a matter of basic metaphysics and epistemology, only I know what 
it is like to experience the world as me. The fact that I know what it is like to 
experience the world from my point of view and not anyone else’s, that mine is the 
point of view and the only point of view that I cannot subtract from the very nature 
of my experience, can seem profound or it can seem trivial. Either way, there is that 
basic fact. 
In a footnote, Nagel states his main point against physicalism. It is that if one 
understood how subjective experience could have an objective nature, one would 
understand the existence of subjects other than oneself. Nagel has argued precisely 
that we cannot understand how subjective experience could have an objective 
nature. This is his major theme in the essay. He argues that we cannot understand 
even what it would mean for physicalism to be true, because to understand that we 
would have to understand how the subjective (a person’s point of view) could 
become objective (publicly accessible, knowable by someone other than herself). 
And that -- how what is subjective in this sense could become objective -- is 
something we cannot understand.  
Now Nagel states that he does not wish to endorse a position of solipsism. He 
allows that I would not know what it is like to be a deaf/blind man, for instance but 
his official position is that I could know what it is like to be someone other than 
myself, provided that person is sufficiently similar to me. (From this qualification, I 
would infer that Nagel would grant that I do not know what it is like to be a warlord, 
but would wish to maintain that I do know what it is like to be my closest woman 
friend.) But I do not think he can support the latter claim because he has committed 
himself to the universal epistemic theory that there is a fundamental sense in which 
no person can ever know what it is like, or would be like, to be any other person.  
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Accordingly, contrary to Nagel’s official dissociation from the problem of 
other minds, there is a gap between the experience of one person and that of 
another, a gap that exists universally between one experiencing subject and another. 
It does not only exist only for persons with radically different backgrounds or 
sensory apparatus. Rather, it applies to any two subjects who have a point of view 
from which they experience the world. Given what Nagel points to as the irreducibly 
subjective and un-capturable of conscious experience, there will always been an 
unbridgeable gulf between my experience and that of another person. I do not know 
and cannot know what it is like to be a young man, an African politician, a warlord, 
or a victim of torture. These matters may be profound. But nor do I have knowledge 
of another’s subjectivity in a more trivial context: I do not even know what it is like 
for my closest woman friend to taste a pineapple. 
Knowing what it is like to experience something means knowing what it is 
like as this person (this creature) to experience it. And only this one can know it. I 
have unique knowledge of my experience, you of yours, and Nagel of his. 
Metaphysically, every consciousness is utterly distinct from every other. The point is 
universal. It seems to establish a kind of unique and special knowledge and indeed 
some kind of authority. But what sorts of knowledge and authority are these? 
 
5. VICTIMS AND NOTIONS OF EPISTEMIC PRIVILEGE 
 
As remarked, these are old questions. I became especially interested in them in 
considering the deference that is often paid to victims of serious wrongdoing. In this 
context I came to identify a line argument granting to victims a kind of epistemic 
and moral authority based on claims of their unique knowledge of their unique 
suffering and reasoning to conclusions about ways in which we should defer to 
victims. We can apply Nagel’s account to argue that there is a profound sense in 
which the suffering of any victim is unique to that person. Only the specific suffering 
victim of a wrong knows what it is like to suffer from her point of view on the world. 
On the grounds that the suffering of a victim is something that only that victim can 
know, it is often argued that we should defer to the authority of the victim on other 
matters. For some, in significant contexts, the force of such arguments is 
considerable: consider, for instance, the seriousness with which victim impact 
statements are taken in many contexts. The uniqueness of victim suffering seems to 
establish an authority or prerogative even over matters of treatment, criminal 
procedure, criminal sentencing, memorialization, and other responses to 
wrongdoing. We may understand such arguments as beginning with the sort of 
subject-based claim developed by Nagel (only the victim of a wrong can know what 
it is to suffer from that wrong) and moving on to assert moral authority in other 
areas, often far removed from first person experience.  
When we reflect on this matter, we can identify basic problems with such 
arguments. Not only are they premised on a supposition of incorrigible knowledge 
about what a victim has experienced, they would have us inappropriately extend the 
supposed authority in the area of ‘what it is like’ too far into further terrain.  
Consider for example the perspective of a victim who has suffered terribly 
from rape and torture. Terribly, we cannot say that suffering from such wrongs is 
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rare. But following Nagel that there is a uniqueness to this person’s experience. Only 
she knows what it is like to go through what she has gone through. Her experience is 
in some irreducible way hers alone. We can use Nagel’s terminology to insist that 
only she knows what it is like to go through this (as herself). But it is difficult to 
otherwise articulate just what she does know when she knows this. Now I 
emphasize here that I do not wish to deny that this person, and all victims of serious 
wrongdoing, deserve respect and consideration in virtue of their experience. The 
questions that need to be considered are what sort of knowledge that is, and what is 
implied by that respect and consideration. 
The victim’s suffering is her experience, felt from her own subjective 
viewpoint; only she can know what it was like to go through this, so no one else can. 
This point, following both upon Nagel’s account and from commonsense 
understanding, does seem important and is granted here. The question I wish to 
raise here concerns not its truth but the further question of what we may derive 
from it, so far as epistemic and moral authority are concerned. We may ask, for 
instance: Does the victim’s knowledge of what it is like to experience these things, 
what it was like for her to experience these things, give her moral authority over 
issues of the criminal responsibility of the perpetrator? Does it establish expertise 
about appropriate sentencing? Or whether a convicted perpetrator should be 
officially pardoned, or forgiven if he repents? Or whether he does genuinely repent 
when he seems to do so? We arrive here at what is called the victim’s prerogative to 
forgive and we need to ask whether there is always such a prerogative. If so, what 
are its foundations? Does her unique subjective knowledge make her an expert over 
matters of the treatment of her own physical and psychic injuries? Or over public 
policies pertaining to issues of the prevention of wrongs, their memorialization, or 
private or public apologies? Contrary to considerable popular wisdom on such 
topics, I humbly submit that the answer to all these questions is ‘no.’ (The victim’s 
prerogative to forgive is often assumed, but is questioned in some recent 
philosophical accounts of forgiveness.) Knowing what it is like to experience 
something, knowing what we may for convenience call ‘the raw edge of 
consciousness,’ does not establish one as a moral or epistemic authority on any of 
these broader matters. They bring in questions of equity, law, science, and the rights 
of other persons. The raw edge of consciousness does not extend far; it is narrow 
indeed.  
The fact that only a victim knows what it is like to suffer as she has does not 
establish that victim to be an authority on treatment, punishment, memorialization, 
forgiveness, or even her own best treatment or the most apt description of what she 
has gone through. Only victims know what it is like to be them, experiencing these 
things; to be sure, victims have some kind of unique authority over that raw edge of 
consciousness. But even if we ignore issues about fallibility here, the inference 
questions remain. What further epistemic authority can be derived from our unique 
firsthand consciousness of our own experience? In the case of a suffering victim, 
how should we move from granting her unique access to ‘the edge?’ The answer 
seems to be ‘not very far.’ Puzzlingly, at this point knowing what it is like seems both 
huge and very small. 
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There is a case to be made, then, that arguments based on subjective 
uniqueness are systematically incorrect because they would have us extract much 
from little. The ‘much’ is a kind of moral and epistemic authority; the ‘little’ is the 
narrowness of the raw edge of consciousness. What do I know when I know what it 
is like to be me, experiencing a hot bath after walking outside on a cold winter day? 
A common philosophical term in the context is ‘qualia.’ I know my qualia. Qualia are 
the felt characteristics of experience that I have referred to here as the raw edge of 
sensation. My qualia are unique to me, Nagel’s to him, and yours to you. 
Wittgenstein (1963) would not like it at all, but we could say that this is it. This, the 
felt sensation or conscious idea, is what I know, and only I know it. I know what it is 
like to be in that hot bath, what I am feeling, what I am thinking. I know the felt 
characteristics of my subjective experience in that circumstance, when I am 
experiencing that. We might also suppose that, having been there (as me) I know 
what it would be like to be there (as me) again. In fact, that supposition can be 
questioned due to variability in memory or ability to articulate. But in any event, 
what would follow from such knowledge? To be sure, only I know what it is like to 
have my experiences of the world from my point of view, only you know what it is 
like to have your experiences of the world from your point of view, only Nagel from 
his, and so on and so forth. But this knowledge does not deductively or inductively 
support claims to broader knowledge of an epistemic, moral, or political nature. 
 
6. STANDPOINT THEORY 
 
We seem here to be dealing with a question of epistemic privilege: in the sorts of 
cases I am considering, the supposed epistemic privilege is that of a victim. To 
ground my discussion of this supposed privilege I will shift to reflect on feminist 
standpoint theory. A standpoint theory may be defined as a theory according to 
which certain persons are taken to have an epistemically privileged position due to 
their experience as oppressed persons in society. In a useful review article Elizabeth 
Anderson (2006) states the requirements for a complete standpoint theory, using 
the notion of ‘privilege’ in a crucial role. Anderson states that a complete standpoint 
theory should include the following: 
 
1.  the social location of the privileged perspective; 
2.  the scope of the privilege claimed; 
3.  the aspect of that social location that generates what is deemed to be 
superior knowledge; 
4.  the ground of the privilege; (I take this to mean an answer to the 
question of what it is about the social location that generates the 
superior knowledge); 
5.  the type of epistemic superiority claimed (is it greater accuracy of 
predictions, moral expertise, greater ability to articulate… or 
whatever?); 
6.  the other perspectives relative to which the epistemic superiority is 
claimed; 
7.  the modes of access to the privileged perspective. 
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We may consider these requirements, remaining with the case of victims as 
explained so far. The social location is that of suffering victim; the scope of epistemic 
privilege is the raw edge of the victim’s own consciousness; the aspect of her 
location generating the epistemic privilege is her experiencing the world from her 
own point of view. The epistemic superiority is restricted to this domain and based 
on the subject’s unique access to it; the superiority is claimed over others who do 
not have this access. The mode of access is direct subjective awareness, that of a 
person experiencing the world from her own point of view. Applying Anderson’s 
account to this case, we find a confirmation of the point previously made: the scope 
of such epistemic privilege is narrow indeed. Political and moral authority are not 
established, and any epistemic authority is severely limited. 
 
7. AUTHORITY, CREDIBILITY, AND SOCIAL PRACTICE 
 
The discussions so far presume that questions about privilege and authority 
pertaining to one’s own experience are epistemic – that because we experience as 
we do, necessarily from our own perspective, we are the only persons who can 
know what it is like to have our own consciousness. So far we have been considering 
what sort of knowledge this might be and what other sorts of knowledge might 
correctly be established on its basis. Some recent authors take a radically different 
approach. They maintain that the epistemic focus amounts to a misdirection, 
arguing that we need instead to consider the granting of authority over one’s own 
beliefs, sensations, and intentions to be a matter of social practice. Claims to such 
effect have recently been made by Mariane Janack (1997), Richard Moran (2001), 
and Victoria McGeer (2008).  
Mariane Janack approaches feminist standpoint theory from a social, rather 
than an epistemic, point of view. She sets her account in the context of well-known 
difficulties with standpoint theory: people who are non-European, female, or lower 
than middle class (and arguably in some sense ‘oppressed’) may not display 
epistemic privilege or authority in the sense of offering the most plausible insights 
into the workings of society. They often disagree with each other, which is another 
problem if one is going to deem them authoritative. The same sorts of 
considerations apply to victims. Though feminist writers typically refer to 
oppressed persons, there is a clear sense in which oppressed persons can be 
regarded as victims. Janack argues that the problem of authority should not be 
understood as a matter of persons being epistemically privileged because they have 
insights that others do not. Rather, she says, it should be understood as a matter of 
social practices. A key problem regarding the sorts of oppressed persons who were 
of concern to early standpoint theorists is that their voices tend to be ignored. They 
have been treated as beings unable to produce their own accounts of their own 
experience. Such accounts as did exist were often not taken seriously by others. For 
example, a doctor was regarded as an authority on the tribulations of early 
pregnancy whereas a pregnant woman not so.  
There are clearly problems of social attitude here, and the solution to them 
lies not in epistemology but in social practice. Concerning oppressed persons and, in 
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particular victims, Janack recommends that we should grant them authority in the 
sense that they are allowed and encouraged to speak from their own perspective, 
and when they do so speak, we should pay attention. On her account this attention is 
not because they have unique insights based on a special standpoint in society but 
rather because they are persons with equal status and deserving to be heard and not 
dismissed. Janack’s point is that the standpoint of such persons should be taken 
seriously in the sense that they should be listened to, not disregarded and not 
discredited. She does not maintain – nor could she plausibly maintain -- that what 
they say is beyond critical scrutiny or that it equips them to be authorities on 
matters of ethics and social policy. 
The notion of incorrigibility may be revisited in this context. Incorrigibility 
can be construed not so much in the epistemic sense of truth about first person 
experience being guaranteed by first person sincerity, but rather as a matter of 
there being no one other than the experiencing who is socially granted the authority 
to correct a person when she describes what she is going through. The subject can 
get it wrong and she can find that out by attending to questions from someone else, 
but in the end it is her own verdict on the correct description that will stand. Let us 
say, for instance, that I feel a kind of surge of unpleasant emotion when someone 
hugs my husband. I think I’m angry. I feel angry, or I seem to feel angry. But wait: 
perhaps it’s something else. My friend asks whether I’m not jealous rather than 
angry. The hugger was a quite attractive woman who has always been an admirer of 
his – and I know that. I think about the matter and realize: yes; it wasn’t simple 
anger that I felt. It was jealousy after all. My interpretation of this flash of feelings 
was not only corrigible; it was corrected by another. We can see from this case that 
one’s knowledge of one’s own experience is corrigible in the sense that a sincere 
report on it may turn out to be incorrect. And yet there remains a sense in which the 
subject’s word is the final word. It is I who allow and acknowledge that my feeling 
was one of jealousy; since only I know what it is like to experience what I did, it is up 
to me to accept the correction or not. It is a matter of social practice that we grant 
people authority over their own sensory, intellectual, and emotional states. I know 
what it is like to be me; my friend does not, and it is she who suggests that I am 
jealous, not angry; I might decide that she is right. But this is for me to decide; mine 
is the final voice on the matter. There is not first person incorrigibility in the sense 
that I cannot make mistakes: my sincerity of at a given time fails to ensure the 
correctness of my claim at that time. But as a matter of social practice, there is 
incorrigibility in the different sense that, in the final analysis, it is for me, the 
experiencing subject, and me alone to allow a correction to stand.  
Victoria McGeer offers an account similar to that of Janack in its shift away 
from epistemology but differing in that she connects the authority of first person 
reports with the agency of persons. Insisting that a person is not a mind-reader of 
herself, McGeer distinguishes first person authority from that to be provided by a 
privileged spectator position. She maintains that there is a non-spectator sense in 
which authority exists: the subject is an agent who decides what to believe, what to 
do, or how to describe what is experienced. McGeer follows Richard Moran 2001. 
Moran urged developing “the transcendental perspective of agency,” which gives a 
kind of first-person authority based on the fact that we are able to step back from 
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our own character and are responsible for what we believe, desire, and intend. 
McGeer maintains that Moran is too Kantian in demanding and that we distance 
ourselves too much from our inclinations. She argues instead for allowance for the 
desires and temptations of an empirical self. But she follows Moran in part and 
claims that, presuming a certain level of moral development, we can recognize that 
just as others may make mistakes and give in to temptations, we may can do so 
ourselves. In the light of such possible failings, it is necessary for a person to reflect 
and then decide for himself or herself what to think and do. These deliberations 
would include reflections on how to do it and how to describe what one is doing. 
This is a matter of agency.  
Each person is and should be her own agent, not permitting others to 
supplant her position. McGeer says that the world of our own experience is 
projectively distorted by our hopes and desires and that a morally wise agent will 
understand those facts and be sensitive to how they affect our empirical selves. She 
states that a morally mature and wise agent is a person who understands the ways 
in which she is responsible for her own psychological states.  
Although the accounts of McGeer and Moran are fascinating and insightful, 
their impact regarding the problems of first person authority, as considered here, 
remains somewhat limited. Even duly considering facts of agency or norms of social 
practice, first person authority is fairly narrow. Considering, specifically, victims, we 
will allow that a victim should have the final say on what she suffered, and that it is 
up to her to decide whether her own descriptions of it merit amendment. We may 
reason with Janack, regarding this victim deserving to be heard, or we may reason 
with Moran and McGeer that it is for the victim as an agent to decide what to believe 
about her experience. These social – as distinct from epistemological - perspectives 
are related to equality, agency, and autonomy. We have shifted from epistemic 
considerations to a considerable extent. This seems like an improvement – though I 
admit to continued puzzlement over limited impact of ‘knowing what it is like to 
be…’ as in Nagel. First person authority so interpreted has its limits. From the claim 
that it is up to me to define what I want, intend, or experience, it will not follow that 
I can claim authority on broader matters such as medical needs, the deserts of 
perpetrators, the content of textbooks, or the appropriate forms of memorialization. 
 
8. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
Attempting now to draw together these points, let me state some preliminary 
conclusions. 
First, it is a mistake to infer from a claim of uniqueness in Nagel’s sense that 
the experiencing subject is in the best position (an authority position) to know some 
further matter, epistemic privilege, or merits epistemic deference on such a matter. 
That obviously extends to issues of public policy. Insofar as this sort of mistake 
occurs quite frequently and involves reasoning from one type of claim to another, 
we may refer to it as a fallacy. Referring specifically to the case of victims, though a 
victim alone may know what it is like to suffer from some injury, it does not follow 
that she is in a unique and privileged position to stipulate what should be done in 
response to that injury.  
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Second, the authority of the first person is extremely limited if we look at it 
from an epistemic point of view as in Nagel’s account. It may be more plausibly 
understood as a matter of social practice, as in the accounts of Janacke, Moran, and 
McGeer. But even there, it is of limited scope. 
Third, further reflections on the implications of experiential uniqueness as in 
Nagel seem to be called for, and might incorporate considerations of social practice. 
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